Prepaid, Debit and Credit Card Security Code Generation System

ABSTRACT

This invention is a comprehensive “Dynamic Security Code” (“DSC”) System (“DSC System”) that can change the security code of a prepaid, debit, or credit card (“Payment Card”). In an effort to thwart Card-Not-Present (“CNP”) fraud, the DSC System provides dynamic security code values (“DSC Values”) that have a limited use. The DSC Values provided by this DSC System can be calculated by various methodologies and can be used within existing standard payment card infrastructures. The DSC System can also be used with other form factors and in other environments not related to payments such as balance inquiries. The DSC Values can be calculated by a DSC Generator Server or on the card itself.

1. PRIORITY

This application claims priority to U.S. patent application Ser. No.15/230,989 titled “Prepaid, Debit and Credit Card Security CodeGeneration System” filed on Aug. 8, 2016, and U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 15/231,069 titled “Prepaid, Debit and Credit Card Security CodeGeneration System” filed on Aug. 8, 2016, both of which are incorporatedby reference in their entirety.

2. FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention provides a system for generating and updating securitycodes for use with prepaid, debit and credit cards. Specifically,prepaid, debit and credit card security codes can be updated by a serverconnected to a network or by an on card algorithm such that when thecard is used with a Delivery Device, new security code(s) are generatedfor future transactions.

3. BACKGROUND

Some payment transactions are made without a payment card, such as adebit or credit card, being read by a payment device. For example, thiscan happen when purchasing goods from an electronic retailer.Cardholders make these so-called Card-Not-Present (“CNP”) transactionsby giving their payment credentials, such as the Primary Account Number(“PAN”), Expiration Date, and security code, to a merchant (e.g., anelectronic retailer) without physically presenting the card to thatmerchant, as opposed to Card-Present transactions where a card isswiped, dipped, or tapped (typically by the cardholder) on a paymentdevice to read the card data and initiate an electronic paymenttransaction.

CNP fraud can occur when valid credentials of a payment card are stolenfrom the genuine cardholder and then used by an unauthorized person toperform a payment transaction. These credentials can be stolen whencomputer systems (e.g., merchant accounts systems) are hacked. Theft ofcard credentials can also occur when unscrupulous individuals recordcard data while processing a payment and before returning the card tothe cardholder. For example, an employee of a restaurant could writedown the information printed on the plastic card of a patron whileprocessing the payment.

Payment card companies use various security codes to combat fraud.Security codes, such as the Card Validation Code 2 (CVC2) and the CardVerification Value 2 (CVV2), were introduced by payment card companiesspecifically to address CNP fraud. These security codes are used assimple static passcodes to help ensure the genuine card is present atthe moment of a CNP transaction. These codes can be printed on the backof a card (e.g., on the card's signature panel), but they can also beprinted on the front of the card.

Although thieves are now forced to copy an additional piece ofinformation to be able to perform fraudulent transactions, the last fewyears have seen ever growing levels of CNP fraud. This happened despitethe attempts of most of the payment card companies to secure thesesecurity codes (e.g., by printing them on the back of the card to forcethieves to copy both side of the card, by making the imprint difficultto read from a certain distance, or by forbidding merchants from storingthose security codes on their systems, even temporarily).

In addition to the direct cost of fraudulent transactions, CNP fraudgenerate additional costs related to the management of fraud cases byissuers and merchants, and also by forcing issuers to issue new cards asa replacement for the counterfeited ones.

There already exist cards that can change their security code on aregular basis. These time-based products use a built-in electroniccircuit with a real-time clock and a battery to calculate a new securitycode after a pre-determined length of time and show it on an electronicdisplay embedded in the card. However, these solutions have a number ofdrawbacks: the real-time clock and the battery make the cards morefragile, the battery makes the card more expensive and limits itslifetime, and the time-based mechanism using the on-card clock makes itprone to de-synchronization with the server. Therefore, a need existsfor a solution that allows for the security codes on cards to be changedduring the lifetime of the cards that is cheaper, more robust, and morereliable than existing solutions.

The benefits of such a solution would be two-fold: first, keeping asolution based on security codes would avoid the need to change orreplace the existing card payment infrastructure; second, changing thevalue of these security codes significantly decreases the possibility offraudulent activity.

SUMMARY

This invention is a comprehensive “Dynamic Security Code” (“DSC”) System(“DSC System”) that can change the security code of a prepaid, debit, orcredit card (“Payment Card”). In an effort to thwart Card-Not-Present(“CNP”) fraud, the DSC System provides dynamic security code values(“DSC Values”) that can have a limited use. When needed, another DSCValue will be generated by a DSC Generator Server on a network orgenerated by the microprocessor embedded in the DSC card. The DSC cardcan also be used with existing standard payment card infrastructures. Inaddition, the DSC System can be used with other form factors and inother environments not related to payments such as balance inquiries.

When a DSC Value needs to be validated by the Issuer, it can be sent tothe Issuer's DSC Validator Server (“DSC Validator Server”) using thesame channels as the ones used for traditional static security codes.For example, when a Cardholder uses a web browser to manually enter theDSC Value in lieu of the static security code into the electronic formprovided by a merchant or into the registration form provided by anonline or mobile wallet provider.

In one embodiment of the invention, DSC Values are generated by a DSCGenerator Server. When needed, the DSC Generator Server will calculateone or more new DSC Values for a specific DSC Card. Examples include,but are not limited to the Issuer's EMV authorization processingperformed during a payment transaction, a purchase transaction, apurchase transaction with cash advance, an account status inquiry, a PINchange transaction, a cash withdrawal. However, it could also be doneduring a card management transaction or any other interaction betweenthe DSC Card and the Issuer.

When DSC Values are generated by a DSC Generator Server, they can bedelivered to the DSC Card by embedding them in an EMV script containedin the Issuer's authorization response message, but the DSC Values couldalso be sent in other types of messages during any other interactionbetween the DSC Card and the Issuer.

In another embodiment of this invention, DSC Values are generated by theDSC Card itself. When needed, the DSC Card will calculate one or morenew DSC Values. Typically, this can be done when the DSC Card isprocessing an EMV transaction in a POS or ATM terminal.

Other systems, methods, features, and advantages of the invention willbe or will become apparent to one with skill in the art upon examinationof the following figures and detailed description. It is intended thatall such additional systems, methods, features and advantages beincluded within this description, be within the scope of the invention,and be protected by the accompanying claims.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The components in the figures are not necessarily to scale, emphasisbeing placed instead upon illustrating the principles of the invention.In the figures, like reference numerals designate corresponding partsthroughout the different views.

FIG. 1 is a side view of a card illustrating visible aspects of one sideof a typical prepaid, debit or credit card.

FIG. 2 is a side view of a card illustrating visible aspects of carddata on one side of a prepaid, debit or credit card.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of the internal hardware components in aprepaid, debit or credit card that can receive periodic updated securitycode information.

FIG. 4 is a flow chart of data movement in a prepaid, debit or creditcard transaction where the security code is periodically updated.

FIG. 5 is a flow chart of data movement in a prepaid, debit and creditcard transaction in a Card-Not-Present operating environment.

FIG. 6 is a flow chart of data movement in prepaid, debit and creditcard transactions with the 3D secure functionality.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

This invention is a comprehensive “Dynamic Security Code” (“DSC”) System(“DSC System”) that can change the security code of a prepaid, debit, orcredit card (“Payment Card”). In an effort to thwart Card-Not-Present(“CNP”) fraud, the DSC System provides dynamic security code values(“DSC Values”) that have a limited use. The DSC Values provided by thisDSC System can be calculated by various methodologies and can be usedwithin existing standard Payment Card infrastructures. The DSC Systemcan also be used with other form factors and in other aspects notrelated to payments such as balance inquiries.

In existing systems that use security codes with static values, the bankor other institution issuing a Payment Card (“Issuer” or “Card Issuer”)provides the static value of a card's security code only once to itsholder (“Cardholder”), by printing the security code on the back of theplastic card. With the DSC System, new DSC Values can be calculated by aDSC Generator Server (“DSC Generator Server”) and delivered to a card(“DSC Card”) when it is communicating with the Issuer, or they can becalculated by the DSC Card itself.

When a DSC Value needs to be validated by the Issuer, it can be sent tothe Issuer's DSC Validator Server (“DSC Validator Server”) using thesame channels as those used for traditional static security codes. Forexample, when a Cardholder uses a web browser to manually enter the DSCValue in lieu of the static security code into the electronic formprovided by a merchant or into the registration form provided by anonline or mobile wallet provider.

In one embodiment of the invention, DSC Values are generated by a DSCGenerator Server. When needed, the DSC Generator Server will calculateone or more new DSC Values for a specific DSC Card. Examples include,but are not limited to the Issuer's EMV authorization processingperformed during a payment transaction, a purchase transaction, apurchase transaction with cash advance, an account status inquiry, a PINchange transaction, a cash withdrawal. However, it could also be doneduring a card management transaction or any other interaction betweenthe DSC Card and the Issuer.

When DSC Values are generated by a DSC Generator Server, they can bedelivered to the DSC Card by embedding them in an EMV script containedin the Issuer's authorization response message, but the DSC Values couldalso be sent in other types of messages during any other interactionbetween the DSC Card and the Issuer.

In another embodiment of this invention, DSC Values are generated by theDSC Card itself. When needed, the DSC Card will calculate one or morenew DSC Values. Typically, this can be done when the DSC Card isprocessing an EMV transaction in a POS or ATM terminal.

There are multiple algorithms that can be used to generate DSC Valuesand they can encompass various forms of data, such as systemconfiguration data, card data, and transaction data. In all embodimentsof this invention, including when the DSC Validator Server supportsseveral algorithms, the generation and the validation of DSC Valuesshould be done with the same algorithm.

In all embodiments where the generation of DSC Values is done whileperforming other card-related processing, this generation should not betied to the outcome of that specific processing. For example, if thegeneration of DSC Values is done during the processing of an EMVtransaction, these values can be delivered to the DSC Card, whether thetransaction is accepted or declined.

A Delivery Device may mean any electronic device capable of transmittingpower and data to a DSC Card. This can be done through standardinterfaces compliant with IS 7816 (“Contact Interface”), IS 14443, IS15693, IS 18092, IS 21481 (“Contactless Interface”), or any otherinterface supported by the DSC Card. Examples of a Delivery Deviceinclude, but are not limited to an EMV Point-of-Sales (“POS”) terminal,an EMV Automated Teller Machine (“ATM”) terminal, an EMV CardholderActivated Terminal (“CAT”), an EMV Automated Fuel Dispenser (“AFD”)terminal, a smartphone or mobile device with NFC capabilities (whetherbuilt-in or through the use of an add-on), a dedicated bank branchterminal, a personal computer (e.g., desktop, laptop, or tablet)equipped with a contact or contactless chip card reader (whetherbuilt-in or through, the use of an add-on).

When used on a Delivery Device, a DSC Card can update its display usinga DSC Value received from the DSC Generator Server, stored in the DSCCard's memory, or generated on the DSC Card itself. Based on theirpreferences, Issuers can decide on different update strategies. Forexample, Issuers may decide to have the DSC Card update its display eachtime it is used on a Delivery Device or for a certain type oftransaction, or based on more complex decision criteria using contextualinformation including, but not limited to card state, transaction data,risk management considerations.

In one embodiment of this invention, a DSC Value can be used for a CNPtransaction next to other card credentials, such as the PAN and ExpiryDate, in lieu of a static security code. The DSC Validator Server willthen validate the DSC Value and share the outcome of the validation withthe Issuer's system as part of the CNP transaction processing.

In another embodiment, a DSC Value can be used as part of a regularCard-Present transaction. For example, in a consumer electronics store,the DSC Value can be used as an additional security step of thetransaction. Similarly to the CNP case, the DSC Value will be validatedby a DSC Validator Server.

In all embodiments, DSC Values can be transmitted to the DSC ValidatorServer using the same channels and interfaces as the ones used totransmit the regular static security codes, such as the Card ValidationCode 2 and the Card Verification Value 2.

FIG. 1 is a side view illustrating visible aspects of one side of a DSCCard 100 that may have the outward appearances of a traditional PaymentCard with a PAN, Expiration Date, name of an individual, company printedon the card. The DSC Card 100 may also have a logo of card issuer, anissuing bank, merchant, etc. (not shown). Also located on the DSC Card100 may be a magnetic stripe 102, a signature area 104, a hologram 106,a display 108, or printed card issuer contact information (not shown).However, with the exception of the display 108, internal electronichardware may be hidden within laminated sheets of plastic, metal, or anyother types of material.

On prior art Payment Cards, a security code may be printed on the card.For DSC Cards 100 that can change their security codes, a display 108may be incorporated into the laminated structure of the card. Foroptimum results, this display 108 may be flexible, such as an electronicpaper display, so that it can handle the stresses generated by card use,while also having the capability of displaying different codes orinformation related to the card and its use. The display 108 may beconfigured for one or more digits and may support the use of charactersas part of the security code or information displayed to the cardholder.

FIG. 2 is a side view of a DSC Card illustrating visible aspects of carddata on one side of a Payment Card. Some DSC Cards 200 show the carddata on one side of the card. In this embodiment, the PAN 202, thevalidity date range or expiration date 204, and/or the Cardholder's name206 can be listed on one side of the card. In addition, less criticalinformation such as the starting date 208 the cardholder started with aparticular card issuer may also be listed. Likewise, on the same side ofthe DSC Card 200, a security code field 210 may be shown in a flexibledisplay such as an electronic paper display so that it can handle thestresses generated by card use. Once again, the display 210 may beconfigured for the display of one or more digits and may support the useof characters as part of the security code or information displayed tothe cardholder.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating the internal hardware componentsof a DSC Card 300. The DSC Card 300 can have a Flexible Printed Circuit(“FPC”) 302. The FPC module 302 can have a microprocessor 304, a display306, a first antenna 308, and potentially other electronic componentsincluding, but not limited to resistors and capacitors. Themicroprocessor 304 may alternatively be a microcontroller. Also, themicroprocessor's functionality may be performed by an embedded securechip 310 that can be either a secure microcontroller or equivalentprocessing capabilities with internal memory or access to a memorylocation (not shown). Likewise, the functionality performed by themicroprocessor 304 may be implemented with multiple hardware components.

A memory storage area embedded within the microprocessor 304 may storeinformation for the DSC Card 300 or the memory location may be an offchip memory area that is connected to the microprocessor 304. Alsoconnected to the microprocessor 304 is a display 306. The display 306may be constructed of a material that allows the display to flex whenthe DSC Card 300 is bent without causing the display to fail. The DSCCard 300 may be configured so data other than DSC Values may be shown onthe display 306, such as a one-time password, the financial balance ofthe card available to the cardholder, an error message, the number ofelectronic tickets or vouchers remaining, or other messages providinginformation to the cardholder.

The microprocessor 304 may also be connected via a plurality ofelectrical connections and/or communication buses 316 to the embeddedsecure chip 310 thus allowing for the transfer of power and data.Currently, five electrical connections and/or communication buses 316link the embedded secure chip 310 to the microprocessor 304 (e.g., twoconnections are for power, two are for data, and one is for a resetfunction).

The FPC 302 inside the DSC Card 300 can be assembled into a thinflexible package called a prelaminate 322 (i.e., card state prior tolamination). The prelaminate 322 is typically a sheet of plastic (ormetal, composite material, or any other material) that can be laminatedbetween two sheets of plastic, metal, composite, or any other materialto form the final version of the DSC Card 300. The prelaminate 322 caninclude the FPC 302, a second antenna 314, electrical connections 316,an embedded secure chip 310, and other components of the DSC Card 300.The DSC card can be formed from a FPC 302 encapsulated between twolaminated blanks formed from plastic materials, composite materials,metal, metal alloys, or ceramic materials.

When the Contact Interface of the DSC Card 300 is used with a DeliveryDevice (“Contact Mode”), the DSC Card 300 receives its power and cantransmit and/or receive data via the ISO contact plate 312 that connectsthe Delivery Device and the DSC Card's embedded secure chip 310. Theembedded secure chip 310 and ISO contact plate 312 can be assembled intoa package called a module 320. The contact connection between the DSCCard's embedded secure chip 310 and the Delivery Device can also providethe pathway for the transmittal and reception of data between theDelivery Device and the FPC 302.

When the Contactless Interface of the DSC Card 300 is used with aDelivery Device (“Contactless Mode”), the DSC Card 300 receives it powerand can transmit and receive data via one or more antennae. In oneembodiment, only one antenna, 308 or 314, may be used to provide powerto the FPC 302. The same antenna 308 or 314 may also provide thecommunication path for exchange of data between the Delivery Device andthe FPC 302. In another embodiment, both antennae 308 and 314 can beused to provide power and/or the communication path for the exchange ofdata between the Delivery Device and the FPC 302.

In all embodiments, and for both the Contact and Contactless Modes, theDSC Card 300 is powered by a power source that is not embedded withinthe DSC Card 300. Typically, this power source is the Delivery Device.

In all embodiments where new DSC Values are generated by a DSC GeneratorServer, and for both the Contact and Contactless Modes, the new DSCValues are transmitted to the DSC Card 300 by a Delivery Device (e.g.,in an EMV Script Tag 71 or 72, or some other suitable transportmechanism). During a transaction in Contact Mode, the DSC Values arereceived through the Delivery Device and the ISO Contact Plate 312connection. During a transaction in Contactless Mode, the DSC Values arereceived via the first antenna 308 and/or second antenna 314.

In one embodiment, the DSC Card 300 itself can generate new DSC Values.When the DSC Card 300 is powered by a Delivery Device, for both theContact and the Contactless Modes, the microprocessor 304 can generateone or more new DSC Values by using a predefined algorithm and inputdata coming from a memory location 318 accessible by the embedded securechip 310 or microprocessor 304 (e.g., cryptographic keys, cardcredentials, payment application data, and/or configuration data) and/ordata coming from the Delivery Device. Microprocessor 304 can handle thefunctionality of the embedded secure chip 310, the security codegeneration and the display driver in either a single chip or dual chiparchitecture. Based on their preferences, Issuers can decide ondifferent strategies. For example, Issuers may decide to have the DSCCard generate one or more new DSC Value(s) each time it is used on aDelivery Device or a certain type of transaction is processed, or basedon more complex decision criteria using contextual informationincluding, but not limited to card state, transaction data, riskmanagement considerations.

In all embodiments, and when the DSC Card 300 is used with a DeliveryDevice to perform additional processes (e.g., to process an EMVtransaction) the generation of new DSC Values should not depend on theoutcome of these additional processes (e.g., new DSC Values can begenerated even when an EMV payment transaction is declined or when theEMV payment transaction is approved by an offline terminal).

In all embodiments of the DSC Card 300, DSC Values—whether generated bya DSC Generator Server or by the DSC Card 300 itself—are stored in amemory location on the embedded secure chip 310 and/or in a memorylocation 318.

In these embodiments, when the DSC Card 300 is used with a DeliveryDevice to perform additional processes (e.g., to process an EMVtransaction) the storage of new DSC Values should not depend on theoutcome of these additional processes (e.g., new DSC Values can bestored even when an EMV payment transaction is declined or when an EMVtransaction is approved by an offline terminal)

Based on their preferences, Issuers can decide to issue the DSC Card 300with or without the first DSC Value(s) stored into the card's memory. Ifthe DSC Card 300 is issued without any DSC Value, the first DSC Value(s)can be delivered when the DSC Card 300 is used for the first time by theCardholder with a Delivery Device. If the DSC Card 300 is issued withone or more initial DSC Values, these DSC Values can be loaded into theDSC Card's memory when it is personalized by the Issuer orpersonalization bureau.

Once the DSC Card 300 is issued, the antennae 308 and/or 314 may be usedto download and update the firmware of the microprocessor 304 orembedded security chip 310, download updated algorithms for calculatingthe DSC Values, resynchronize the card with the card Issuer's network,or download an updated list of DSC Values into the DSC Card's memory.

DSC Value(s) stored in the DSC Card's memory, whether generated by a DSCGenerator Server or by the DSC Card itself, can be encrypted.Cryptographic key(s) stored into the DSC Card's memory, whether used togenerate new DSC Values or to encrypt and decrypt stored DSC Values, canbe encrypted.

DSC Value(s) can be stored into devices with a form factor that is notcompliant with the IS 7810's ID-1 format. Examples include other cardform factors, but also non-card form factors including, but not limitedto hardware tokens, key fobs, wearable devices (such as a healthmonitoring device), mobile applications running on smartphones.Similarly, these other form factors can also be used to generate new DSCValues.

The functionality of the DSC Server described in this inventioncomprises of at least two modules, the generation and delivery of newDSC Values by the DSC Generator Server and the validation of DSC Valuesby the DSC Validator Server. The two modules may operate on the samesystem or may be split and operate on separate systems. The DSCGenerator Server and/or the DSC Validator Server can be operated by theIssuer or by third parties, on in-house systems and/or hosted systems.

FIG. 4 is a flow chart of data movement in a Payment Card transactionwhere the DSC Value(s) can be updated based upon the occurrence ofcertain events, including, but not limited to an online authorizationrequest, an online PIN change or card management transaction, a cashwithdrawal. As an example implementation, a DSC Card 400 utilizes theEMV standard so that the DSC Card 400 is operable on an Online DeliveryDevice 402, such as a Point-Of-Sales (“POS”) Terminal and/or ATMterminal. Payment transaction data processed by the Online DeliveryDevice 402 can be sent across the network 406 (including, but notlimited to a payment service provider, an acquirer, a processor, a cardscheme network) to a card Issuer 408. Typically, payment transactionsinclude, but are not limited to data needed to request a transactionapproval, a balance inquiry such as when the card is presented to an ATMterminal. In this invention, the DSC Card 400 can also use a paymenttransaction to send information about its state (including, but notlimited to what is showed on its electronic display, what is stored inits storage memory) back to the DSC Generator Server 410. The cardIssuer 408 can approve or deny the payment transaction or the cardinformation inquiry to the Cardholder. During the transactionprocessing, one or more new DSC Value(s) may be generated by the DSCGenerator Server 410 and transmitted back though the network 406 (e.g.,in an EMV script) to the Online Delivery Device 402. The Online DeliveryDevice 402 then sends the new DSC Values(s) to the DSC Card 400 forstorage and/or display. After the DSC Card 400 has updated its display,it may send a message across the network 406 and back to the Issuer 408to confirm the update of the display. This confirmation message cantransmit additional data including, but not limited to the actual valuethat has been displayed, a reference value of the value that has beendisplayed, the value stored in its storage memory.

As another example implementation, a DSC Card 400 utilizes the EMVstandard so that the DSC Card 400 is operable on an Offline orOffline-Capable Delivery Device 404, such as a POS Terminal. Paymenttransaction data processed by the Offline or Offline-capable DeliveryDevice 404 are not sent online through the network 406. Rather, thepayment transaction is authorized locally by the Offline orOffline-Capable Delivery Device 404 and the Payment transaction data maybe stored in a memory location on the Offline or Offline-CapableDelivery Device 404 and later transmitted through the network 406 to theIssuer 408 for updating its transaction records and the DSC Validatorrecords. In this implementation, no new DSC Values(s) are generated bythe DSC Generator Server 410 because the DSC Card 400 will not be incommunication with the card Issuer 408. However, if capable, the DSCCard 400 could generate, store, and display new DSC Value(s) or displaya stored DSC Value when operated on an Offline or Offline-CapableDelivery Device 404.

Based on their preferences, Issuers can decide on different strategies.For example, Issuers may decide to have the DSC Generator Server 410generate one or more new DSC Value(s) each time it is communicating witha DSC Card 400 or a certain type of transaction is processed, or basedon more complex decision criteria using contextual informationincluding, but not limited to card state, transaction data, riskmanagement considerations.

In another embodiment, Issuers can have offline Delivery Devices querythe DSC Card 400 regarding the number of DSC Value(s) remaining in astored list in the Card 400. If the number of DSC Value(s) stored inmemory on the Card 400 are at or below a predetermined number (e.g.,one, two or more based on the Issuers' preference), the Delivery Device404 can be forced to go online so that an additional DSC Value or DSCValues can be downloaded by the DSC Generator Server 410.

FIG. 5 is a flow chart of data movement in a CNP transaction. In such anoperating environment, the chip of the DSC Card 500 is not used andinstead the Cardholder enters their card information (this includes, butit not limited to the PAN, the expiration date, the Cardholder name, theDSC Value displayed by the DSC Card 500) on a mobile device, laptop, ordesktop. In such CNP transactions, the cardholder can input the carddata into a browser or app 502 that connects to a merchant 504. ThePayment Card transaction information is sent through a network 506 to acard Issuer 508.

In a CNP payment transaction, the DSC Value received by the Issuer 508,in lieu of the regular static security code, is validated by the DSCValidator Server 510. The DSC Validator Server 510 can provide differenttypes of answers to the Issuer 508, depending on the type of DSC Valuevalidation that is performed. For example, the DSC Validator Server 510could provide a simple binary answer (i.e., the DSC Value is correct ornot correct) or a more complex answer to the Issuer 508 (e.g., the DSCValue is contained within an acceptable range). The DSC Validator Server510 can also respond with the regular static security value associatedwith the DSC Card 500's PAN and Expiry Date, and that can be used tosubstitute the DSC Value in the authorization request message. Once thecard Issuer 508 authorizes a transaction, the transaction authorizationresponse is transmitted back though the network 506 and on through tothe merchant 504. The merchant can then alert the Cardholder via thebrowser/application 502 that the transaction was authorized or denied.Once the payment transaction is authorized, the Issuer 508 can recognizethat the transaction was a CNP transaction and no new DSC Value isgenerated since the DSC Card 500 is not in communication with the Issuer508. Similarly, the DSC Card 500 cannot generate new DSC Value(s) sinceit is not being used on a Delivery Device.

FIG. 6 is a flow chart of data movement in a CNP transaction using 3-DSecure (“3DS”) functionality. DSC Card 600 information is typed into abrowser or online application 602 when the cardholder uses a DSC Card600 to conduct a CNP transaction. The merchant 606 can check with theRegistry 608 whether the DSC Card 600 supports the 3DS functionality.The merchant 606 also transmits payment transaction data that involves arequest for transaction approval. The Registry 608 is in communicationwith the merchant 606, network 610 and/or Issuer 612. If 3DS is notsupported, the transaction is processed as described in FIG. 5. If 3DSis supported, the merchant 606 redirect the browser or onlineapplication 602 to the Access Control Server 604. The Access ControlServer 604 (“ACS”) can implement a DSC Validator Server as part of 3DS'Cardholder Authentication step. Programs such as Verified By Visa andMasterCard SecureCode are examples of the implementation of the 3DStechnology. The ACS 604 is in communication with the Issuer 612.

When 3DS transactions are approved or denied, the card Issuer 612 doesnot generate any new DSC Value(s) as the transaction was previouslyidentified as a CNP transaction and there is no connection to upload anynew DSC Value(s) onto the DSC Card 600.

While various embodiments of the invention have been described, it willbe apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that many moreembodiments and implementations are possible that are within the scopeof this invention.

What is claimed is:
 1. An FPC embedded in an electronic card forconducting transactions, comprising: an electronic display; amicroprocessor electrically coupled to the display; an embedded securechip electrically coupled to the microprocessor and configured toreceive an ISO contact plate; a first antenna electrically coupled tothe microprocessor; and a second antenna electrically coupled to theembedded secure chip.
 2. The FPC embedded in an electronic card forconducting transactions of claim 1, where the embedded secure chip iselectrically coupled with an ISO contact plate.
 3. An FPC embedded in anelectronic card for conducting transactions, comprising: an electronicdisplay; a microprocessor electrically coupled to the electronic displayand configured to receive an antenna; and an embedded secure chipelectrically coupled to the microprocessor and configured to receive anISO contact plate and an antenna.
 4. The FPC embedded in an electroniccard for conducting transactions of claim 3, where the embedded securechip is electrically coupled with an ISO contact plate.
 5. The FPCembedded in an electronic card for conducting transactions of claim 4,where the embedded secure chip is electrically coupled to a firstantenna.
 6. The FPC embedded in an electronic card for conductingtransactions of claim 5, where the microprocessor is electricallycoupled to a second antenna.
 7. The FPC embedded in an electronic cardfor conducting transactions of claim 3, where the embedded secure chipis electrically coupled to a first antenna.
 8. The FPC embedded in anelectronic card for conducting transactions of claim 7, where themicroprocessor is electrically coupled to a second antenna.
 9. An FPCembedded in an electronic card for conducting transactions, comprising:an electronic display; an embedded secure chip electrically coupled tothe electronic display and configured to receive an ISO contact plate; afirst antenna electrically coupled to a power circuit of the embeddedsecure chip; and a second antenna electrically coupled to the embeddedsecure chip.
 10. The FPC of embedded in an electronic card forconducting transactions claim 9, where the embedded secure chip iselectrically coupled to an ISO contact plate.
 11. An FPC embedded in anelectronic card for conducting transactions, comprising: an electronicdisplay; a microprocessor electrically coupled to the electronic display& configured to receive an embedded secure chip; a first antennaelectrically coupled to the microprocessor; and a second antennaconfigured to receive an embedded secure chip.
 12. The FPC embedded inan electronic card for conducting transactions of claim 11, where themicroprocessor and the second antenna are electrically coupled to anembedded secure chip.
 13. The FPC embedded in an electronic card forconducting transactions of claim 12, where the embedded secure chip iselectrically coupled to an ISO contact plate.
 14. An FPC embedded in anelectronic card for conducting transactions, comprising: an electronicdisplay; a microprocessor electrically coupled to the electronic display& configured to receive an embedded secure chip; and an antennaconfigured to receive an embedded secure chip.
 15. The FPC embedded inan electronic card for conducting transactions of claim 14, where themicroprocessor and the antenna are electrically coupled to an embeddedsecure chip.
 16. The FPC embedded in an electronic card for conductingtransactions of claim 15, where with the embedded secure chip iselectrically coupled to an ISO contact plate.
 17. The FPC embedded in anelectronic card for conducting transactions of claim 16, where with themicroprocessor is electrically coupled to a second antenna.
 18. The FPCembedded in an electronic card for conducting transactions of claim 15,where the microprocessor is electrically coupled to a second antenna.19. An FPC embedded in an electronic card for conducting transactions,comprising: an electronic display; and a microprocessor electricallycoupled to the electronic display & configured to receive embeddedsecure chip.
 20. The FPC embedded in an electronic card for conductingtransactions of claim 19, where the microprocessor is electricallycoupled to an embedded secure chip.
 21. The FPC embedded in anelectronic card for conducting transactions of claim 20, where theembedded secure chip is electrically coupled to an ISO contact plate.22. The FPC embedded in an electronic card for conducting transactionsof claim 21, where the embedded secure chip is electrically coupled toan antenna.
 23. The FPC embedded in an electronic card for conductingtransactions of claim 22, where the microprocessor is electricallycoupled to a second antenna.
 24. The FPC embedded in an electronic cardfor conducting transactions of claim 20, where the embedded secure chipis electrically coupled to an antenna.
 25. The FPC embedded in anelectronic card for conducting transactions of claim 24, where themicroprocessor is electrically coupled to a second antenna.
 26. An FPCembedded in an electronic card for conducting transactions, comprising:an electronic display configured to receive an embedded secure chip; afirst antenna configured to receive a power circuit of an embeddedsecure chip; and a second antenna configured to receive an embeddedsecure chip.
 27. The FPC embedded in an electronic card for conductingtransactions of claim 26, where the electronic display is electricallycoupled to an embedded secure chip.
 28. The FPC embedded in anelectronic card for conducting transactions of claim 27, where theembedded secure chip is electrically coupled to an ISO contact plate.29. An FPC embedded in an electronic card for conducting transactions,comprising: an electronic display configured to receive an embeddedsecure chip; and a first antenna configured to receive an embeddedsecure chip.
 30. The FPC embedded in an electronic card for conductingtransactions of claim 29, where the electronic display is electricallycoupled to an embedded secure chip.
 31. The FPC embedded in anelectronic card for conducting transactions of claim 30, where theembedded secure chip is electrically coupled to an ISO contact plate.32. The FPC embedded in an electronic card for conducting transactionsof claim 31, where the embedded secure chip is electrically coupled to asecond antenna.
 33. The FPC embedded in an electronic card forconducting transactions of claim 30, where the embedded secure chip iselectrically coupled to a second antenna.